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Interpreting probability in causal mod-
els for cancer
Federica Russo and Jon Williamson
ab st ract . How should probabilities be interpreted in causal mod-
els in the social and health sciences? In this paper we take a step
towards answering this question by investigating the case of cancer in
epidemiology and arguing that the objective Bayesian interpretation
is most appropriate in this domain.
After introducing the problem in §1 and giving an overview of
causal analysis in the social and health sciences in §2, in §3 we present
the cancer case study in some detail. In §4 we discuss the importance
of correctly interpreting probability. Then, in §5, we put forward some
desiderata that an interpretation of probability ought to satisfy; two
Bayesian interpretations of probability come out well according to
these desiderata. In §6 we go further by showing how the full-blown
objectivity of objective Bayesianism is needed for the practice of can-
cer treatment. Finally we discuss the ramications of this conclusion
for the social and health sciences in §7.
1 Introduction
Whilst it might seem uncontroversial that the health sciences search for
causes|that is, for causes of disease and for eective treatments|the causal
perspective is less obvious in the social sciences, perhaps because it is ap-
parently harder to glean general laws in the social sciences than in other
sciences. Thus the search for causes in the social sciences is often perceived
to be a vain enterprise and it is often thought that social studies merely
describe the phenomena.
On the other hand an explicit causal perspective can already be found
in pioneering works of Adolphe Quetelet and Emile Durkheim in demogra-
phy and sociology respectively, and the social sciences have taken a signi-
cant step in quantitative causal analysis by following Sewall Wright's path
analysis, which was rst applied in population genetics. Subsequent de-
velopments of path analysis|e.g., structural models, covariance structure
models and multilevel analysis|have the merit of making the concept of218 Federica Russo and Jon Williamson
cause operational by introducing causal relations into the framework of sta-
tistical modelling. H owever, these developments in causal modelling leave a
number of conceptual issues unanswered: for instance the question of how
probability should be interpreted in probabilistic causal models.
In the philosophy of probability many interpretations have been pro-
posed and crucial objections raised. F or instance, it has been argued that
the frequency interpretation does not make sense in the single-case, that
subjectivist accounts lead to arbitrariness in probability assignments, and
that logical interpretations, though suited to gambling situations, are of
scarce applicability in science.
In this paper we raise the problem of the interpretation of probability
within a specic context: causal models in cancer epidemiology.1 This is
motivated by the thought that competing interpretations are not right or
wrong, but that they are better or worse suited to particular contexts and
the demands we make of them. To this end, we rst introduce causal anal-
ysis in the social and health sciences and then present the case of cancer
epidemiology in some detail. We pay particular attention to explaining dif-
ferent possible meanings of probabilistic statements in this context and the
importance of choosing one interpretation of probability over another. We
then argue that any satisfactory interpretation of probability should satisfy
ve desiderata; this narrows down the choice to the frequency interpreta-
tion twinned with an empirically-based subjective interpretation or with an
objective B ayesian interpretation. We go on to argue that the probabilities
in causal models in cancer epidemiology should be given a frequency-cum-
objective-B ayesian interpretation; the main reason for this choice is the
need to cope with two dierent types of probabilistic inference, generic and
single-case.
2 C ausality in th e social and h ealth sciences
Dierent social sciences study society from dierent perspectives. Sociol-
ogy studies the structure and development of human society, demography
attends to the vital statistics of populations, economics studies the manage-
ment of goods and services, epidemiology studies the distribution of disease
in human populations and the factors determining that distribution, etc.
In spite of these dierences, the social and health sciences share a common
objective: to understand, predict and intervene on society. K nowledge of
1We are fairly lib eral as to w h ich models count as causal. A rguab ly, a model is causal
if its relationsh ip s are interp reted causally or p ut to causal use. T h us associational and
regression models, w h ich tend not b e ex p licitly causal, w ould count as causal for us if
th e relationsh ip s in th e model are interp reted causally (e.g., if an association b etw een
smok ing and cancer is interp reted as sup p orting th e claim th at smok ing causes cancer)
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causes is required to achieve this common goal; such knowledge provides an
explanation of social phenomena as well as of individual behaviour.
Whilst social scientists have been looking for social causes, health scien-
tists traditionally focus on the biological causes of diseases. F or instance,
in L e S uicide Emile Durkheim studies suicide as a social phenomenon and
consequently looks for the social causes of the suicide rate in the population.
M odern medicine, since the work of C laude B ernard (1813-1878), tries to
identify physiological mechanisms active in living beings. The H enle-K och
P ostulates, formulated by R obert K och in 1882, provided criteria for judge-
ments about the presence of micro-organisms as causes of disease (K och,
1882). F or instance, the current theory of carcinogenesis involves a particu-
lar molecular mechanism. U nder normal circumstances the growth of cells is
controlled accurately by inherited mechanisms and stimulated or inhibited
as required. C ancer occurs when genetic alterations (mutations) disturb
the normal regulation of a cell and cause it to erroneously multiply|with
potentially fatal consequences. M utations like this trigger cell growth either
directly or indirectly by disrupting the mechanisms responsible for limiting
cell division. On the other hand, the social sciences try to understand the va-
riety of ways in which the population is exposed to carcinogenic substances,
according to levels of education, economic status, type of occupation, etc.
The association between diseases and various socio-economic factors is
the object of research in several disciplines. In particular, epidemiology
typically tries to single out individual genetic factors, biological factors,
and environmental risk factors. Studies have recently focused on the role of
neighbourhood environment (see P ickett and P earl (2001) for a literature
review). N eighbourhood environment aects health through the availability
and accessibility of health services, infrastructure deprivation, stress, lack of
social support, and so on. An established tradition in sociology successfully
studies the impact of neighbourhood environment on sociological outcomes
such as educational attainment and labour market opportunity by taking
advantage of multilevel analysis. Epidemiology picks up this tradition and
uses multilevel analysis to examine group level eects on individual health.
Thus, although for long time the social and health sciences have trodden
quite dierent and independent paths, a new perspective integrating both
approaches is now seeming to emerge.
The case of epidemiology is of particular interest since it has been argued
that an integration of the social science approach and the health science ap-
proach will get at a better understanding of causal relations (see Susser and
Susser (1996); V ineis et al. (2004); Weed (2000) and references therein).
Some time ago the same methodological turn was also advanced in de-
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mortality in developing countries: social and economic determinants exert
an impact on mortality through biological mechanisms. H ence, M osley and
C hen's approach|which now constitutes the received view in the specic
eld of child mortality in developing countries|incorporates both social
and biological variables and integrates research methods proper to the two
domains. B ecause of this move to consider both biological and social factors
when explaining a given phenomenon, we see epidemiology as paradigmatic
of the social and health sciences.
Epidemiology, being interested in the biological and social determinants
of diseases and in their distribution on the population, has cognitive and
practical goals. The cognitive goal concerns the aetiology of diseases, and
the practical goal concerns the implications of such causal knowledge on
policy making and also on causal attribution and diagnosis in particular
individuals.
In x3 we shall focus our attention on the case of cancer epidemiology.
This will help us make two major points in the paper. F irst, epidemiology
is concerned with two dierent types of causal inferences. One is generic and
concerns the population as a whole, and the other is single-case and con-
cerns particular individuals.2 Second, both causal inferences are essentially
probabilistic; consequently we raise the question of which interpretation
of probability best ts these probabilistic inferences. We shall argue that
probabilities have to be interpreted according to an objective B ayesian ap-
proach in the single case and according to a frequentist approach in generic
inferences.
3 C ase study: cancer
In the late '50s, when he was a scientic consultant for the Tobacco M anu-
facturers Standing C ommittee, Sir R onald F isher advanced that the corre-
lation between smoking and lung cancer was due to an unknown genotype
in uencing both smoking behaviour and the predisposition to lung cancer,
thus casting doubt on the hypothesis of a direct causal link from smoking to
lung cancer.3 The primary intent of F isher was to point to the well known
fact that correlation is not causation and that alternative explanations|
2T h ere is a sub tlety h ere: th e distinction b etw een p op ulation-level and indiv idual-level
(commonly draw n w ith regard to causal claims) does not q uite corresp ond to th e distinc-
tion (commonly draw n w ith regard to interp retations of p rob ab ility ) b etw een th e generic
and th e single case. T h is can b e seen from th e follow ing claims. In general, ineq uality
(p op ulation-level, generic) causes deterioration in h ealth (p op ulation-level, generic). T h e
ineq uality of h er comp atriots (p op ulation-level b ut single-case) is a cause of N aomi's de-
terioration in h ealth (indiv idual-level, single-case) (G ly mour, 2003). T o simp lify matters
w e sh all restrict our attention to th e generic / single-case distinction in th is p ap er.
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such as the one of an unknown genotype|could equally well account for
statistical correlations.
Since then, cancer research has gone a long way. The link between smok-
ing and cancer has been investigated under almost every possible angle.
F or instance, scientists try to establish the eect of tobacco control pro-
grams on declines in smoking and heart disease mortality (B arnoya and
G lantz, 2004). In this type of study the causal eectiveness of tobacco con-
sumption on lung cancer is implicitly assumed. H owever, if we can ascribe
a decrease in mortality rates to a decrease in smoking, this will provide
further epidemiological evidence. F isher's hypothesis of a gene regulating
cancer predisposition has not been dismissed, however. F or instance, a re-
cent study (H wang et al., 2003) tried to assess the causal role of the p53
germline. R esults indicate that a cancer predisposition due to a p53 muta-
tion is signicantly increased by cigarette smoking.
Specic studies concerning particular populations or subpopulations, such
as those mentioned above, contribute to the mapping of the aetiology of
cancer. F rom an epistemological viewpoint, the problem is how to gather
together knowledge acquired in those specic studies in order to attain gen-
eral epidemiological knowledge abut cancer. C onsider for instance the two
following papers: L agiou et al. (2005); V ineis et al. (2004). These articles
intend to provide a rather complete overview of the present state of af-
fairs. That is, the aim is to summarize various epidemiological evidence on
tobacco and cancer coming from specialised studies.
The mapping of the aetiology of cancer bears on several questions. One
is the question of which types of cancer are due to tobacco consumption.
There are several: lung, nasal cavity, stomach, liver, kidney, uterine cervix.4
Another is the question of which biological factors are carcinogenic (e.g.,
hepatitis B and C virus, helicobacter pylori, human papilloma viruses, etc.)
and which cancer sites are associated with these factors. A third question
concerns the occupational chemicals that produce cancer; for instance, ar-
senic, asbestos, benzene, hair dyes, painting materials, soot. F rom a medical
viewpoint it is important to understand which cancer sites are most often
associated with exposure to these substances; on the other hand from a
demographic viewpoint it is also important to gure out which parts of the
population, in terms of social class or occupation, are more exposed to those
carcinogenic substances and what the intensity of exposure is. A large part
of medical and epidemiological research in cancer aetiology also focusses on
4A lth ough ep idemiological studies h ave variab ly sh ow n p ositive, inverse or null as-
sociations b etw een cigarette smok ing and b reast cancer, ex p erimental studies indicate
th at tob acco smoke contains p otential h uman b reast carcinogens. S ee T erry and Roh an
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the genetic factors predisposing or preventing cancer. Dietary behaviour,
lifestyle factors (e.g., passive smoking, consumption of alcoholic beverages,
ultraviolet radiation), and socio-demographic characteristics related to can-
cer are likewise investigated.
It is worth pointing out that results of particular studies do not auto-
matically count as epidemiological evidence. Their soundness is evaluated
according to specic criteria. The International Agency for R esearch on
C ancer (IAR C ) classies evidence of carcinogenicity into four categories:5
su cient, limited, inadequate and evidence suggesting lack of carcinogenic-
ity. We have su cient evidence when a positive relationship has been ob-
served between the exposure and cancer in studies in which chance, bias and
confounding could be ruled out with reasonable condence. Evidence is lim-
ited if the working group considers the association credible, but chance, bias
and confounding could not be ruled out with reasonable condence. Evi-
dence is inadequate if the available studies are of insu cient quality, con-
sistency or statistical power to permit a conclusion about the presence or
absence of a causal relation. F inally, evidence suggests lack of carcinogenic-
ity when several studies are consistent in not showing a positive association
between exposure to the agent and any studied cancer at any observed level
of exposure.6
If this tells us something about the kind of evidence (biological and social)
used to support causal statements and about the criteria used for evaluating
those results, it doesn't say anything about the very concept of causation
underlying causal analysis in cancer epidemiology.
In the following, we shall not review the extensive epidemiological liter-
ature to come up with an inventory of dierent concepts of cause. Such an
overview of dierent concepts of cause in epidemiology is oered in recent
publications (see P arascandola and Weed (2001) and references therein);
virtues, faults and applicability of various concepts|production, necessary
and su cient, su cient-component, counterfactual, probabilistic|are pre-
sented there. We won't even enter the debate about whether a probabilistic
concept of causality does a better job than a deterministic one (although this
seems to be the most recent point of view emerging, see P arascandola and
Weed (2001); V ineis et al. (2004)). Instead, we shall focus on causal mod-
els and inferences in cancer epidemiology where, as matter of fact, causal
relations are probabilistically characterized. It is worth noting, however,
that a probabilistic methodology and epistemology do not necessarily im-
5S ee V ineis et al. (2004, p . 100) and L agiou et al. (2005, p . 569), and th e IA RC w eb
site h ttp ://monograp h s.iarc.fr/E N G /P reamb le/index .p h p .
6O f course, ev idence of lack of carcinogenicity req uires th at studies meet to a su cient
degree th e standards of design, and in p articular th at b ias, confounding and missclassi-
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ply that the concept of cause|i.e., the cause in the metaphysical sense|is
itself probabilistic.7 C onsequently, \probabilistic" has to be understood in
a non-metaphysical sense|i.e., as just referring to the use of probabilistic
models for causal analysis in cancer epidemiology.
As mentioned above, there is now unquestionable evidence that tobacco
is a powerful carcinogenic substance that can cause cancer in many dierent
organs. It is also commonly agreed that while tobacco consumption raises
the probability of developing cancer, tobacco consumption|whether active
or passive|is not a su cient cause. In other words, what scientists seek to
establish is the extent to which smoking increases the probability of devel-
oping cancer, or the extent to which exposure to a carcinogenic substance
such as asbestos in uences cancer rates, or the extent to which particular
dietary habits prevent|i.e., lower the probability of developing|cancer.
Thus, causation of cancer is conceptualized in a probabilistic sense involv-
ing statistical terms and procedures. Whether studies are experimental or
observational, the goal in both cases is to reduce uncertainty, by performing
as many studies as possible to generate sensible summary statistics, and by
reducing confounding and bias. Dierent statistical models, ranging from
multiple regression analysis to structural modelling, are used to accomplish
this task.
It is not hard to see that these probabilistic models only allow for prob-
abilistic inferences. B ut what types of inferences are we concerned with?
The rst type of inference, which we shall call generic inference, aims at es-
tablishing whether or not a factor is a cause of disease by deciding whether,
roughly, alterations in the frequency or intensity of this factor are accom-
panied by alterations in the frequency or intensity of disease. This corre-
sponds to the naive causal statement `smoking causes lung cancer.' The
second type of inference, which we shall call single-case inference, is instead
concerned with particular individuals. F or instance, exposure to a known
cause of cancer implies that this individual is now more likely to develop
cancer. Assessing single-case probabilities for particular individuals is a real
worry for practicians, and in fact one goal of Evidence B ased M edicine is to
provide guidelines to tackle particular situations.8 P arascandola and Weed
(2001, p. 908) echo C ox's, H olland's and Olsen's criticisms of probabilistic
accounts: a probabilistic theory of causation, based on statistical inequali-
ties, is inadequate since it leaves unclear what it means for smoking to raise
the probability of an individual developing lung cancer. They argue that
in this respect counterfactuals help. Instead, we argue that the problem is
7P arascandola and Weed (2001, p . 906) make th is p oint b ut don't develop it furth er.
8S ee for instance online resources of th e C entre for H ealth E v idence,
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not the inadequacy of probabilistic theories but rather a neglected aspect
of them: the distinction between the generic and the single-case.
L agiou et al. (2005, p. 569) seem to have grasped the importance of such
a distinction, for they claim that although criteria such as those mentioned
above are surely important for discerning causal association from non-causal
association, they do not allow one to separate the dierent issues posed by
(i) the results of a single study, (ii) the results of several studies, and (iii)
the likelihood of causation in a particular individual. They acknowledge
that an individual study (what they call level I) does not allow one to infer
causation but can provide evidence when we already have several studies
(level II) pointing to the same causal relation. L evel II, however, is not
su cient to establish a causal link between an individual's exposure and
disease. What it is still possible to do, they claim, is to infer from level II
that the specic individual's illness was more likely than not caused by the
specied exposure. This highlights the levels of causation and the dierent
types of inferences we make either concerning the population as a whole or
concerning particular individuals.
The discussion, however, is not pushed further. In particular, only to
recognise dierent types of inferences is not enough: those inferences are
probabilistic and consequently raise the problem of how probability has to
be interpreted. This is the question we turn to next.9
4 Interpreting probability
In the philosophy of probability there is a wide-ranging debate about inter-
pretation. Indeed, discussions about the m eaning of probability began as
early as the rst formulations of probability theory. We direct the reader
to H acking (1975) and G illies (2000) for interesting historical overviews.
As we have seen in x3, causal inferences in cancer epidemiology are es-
sentially probabilistic. A standard objection to probabilistic theories of
causation is that the claim `smoking raises the probability of lung can-
cer' is ambiguous for it might be interpreted in dierent ways. It might
say that within the population, the proportion of those who develop lung
cancer is greater amongst smokers. It might also say that if a particular
patient smokes, then it's more likely that she will develop lung cancer. This
ambiguity motivates a distinction between dierent levels of causation and
consequently between dierent types of causal inferences: generic and single-
case. Those claims state, in dierent terms, a probabilistic relation between
9Inferences in cancer ep idemiology, w h eth er generic or single-case, are also b ased on
th e comp utation of relative risk s and odds ratios. In th e ap p endix w e b rie y address th e
p rob lem of correctly interp reting th ese measures and argue th at th e generic/single-case
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smoking and lung cancer. B ut what does probability mean in these cases?
Is there a unique interpretation tting the two examples equally well? Or
should we attach a dierent meaning to probability depending on the claim
at stake?
It is not hard to see that those claims state quite dierent things. A
generic causal claim posits an average causal relation, which is supposedly
valid for the majority of individuals exposed within the population. The
adoption of a probabilistic framework entails, by itself, that such a causal
claim is not a universal and necessary law, and, consequently, that not every
individual in the population who instantiates the cause will instantiate the
eect. In fact, as is well known, some smokers never develop cancer, and
some non-smokers instead do. This leads us to ask what the meaning of
a single-case causal claim is. Two meanings ought to be distinguished. In
one case we wish to make a prediction: your smoking now makes you more
likely to develop cancer in the future. A second interpretation is instead
retrospective: it is likely that smoking caused you to develop lung cancer.
It is then apparent that the meaning of probability for generic causal
claims is connected with frequency of occurrence, whereas for single-case
causal claims the meaning is closer to something like belief or credence
about what will happen or happened. A competing interpretation for the
single-case is single-case chance. H owever, as we shall see, single-case chance
raises problems of epistemic access.
The overview we oer next is meant to see whether any of the leading
interpretations provide sensible meaning both for generic and single-case
claims. H owever, we shall see that none of these interpretation succeeds.
In x5 we argue that a frequency interpretation is needed for the generic
and that a B ayesian approach is needed for the single case. In x6 we will
argue that practical considerations motivate choosing the objective B ayesian
approach over the empirically-based B ayesian approach.
We will now sketch very brie y the main features of the four leading
contenders: (i) the classical and logical interpretations; (ii) the physical in-
terpretations: frequency and propensity; (iii) the subjective interpretation;
(iv) the objective B ayesian interpretation.
The classical interpretation of probability denes probability as the ratio
between the number of favourable cases and the number of all equipossible
cases. The easiest way to grasp the meaning of favourable and equipossible
cases is to think of dice. The six sides of a die constitute the probability
space|i.e., the six possible outcomes. Assuming that the die is not biased,
the six sides are all equipossible|i.e., they all have the same probability
of occurring uppermost. The favourable cases constitute the event we are
interested in. F or instance, the probability that an even number will result226 Federica Russo and Jon Williamson
is given by the number of favourable cases (sides 2, 4 and 6) over the total
number of the equipossible cases (for an unbiased die: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)
which gives 3
6, i.e.,1
2.
F irst developed by L aplace (1814), a similar interpretation was also pro-
posed by P ascal. P robability values are assigned in the absence of any
evidence|the probability of an event is simply the fraction of the total
number of possibilities in which the event occurs. The notion of equipossi-
bility is expressed by what K eynes called the P rinciple of Indierence. This
principle states that whenever there is no evidence favouring one possibility
over another, these possibilities have the same probability. The classical
interpretation seems especially well suited to games of chance, although it
is sometimes objected that this interpretation suers the problem of circu-
larity, for equipossible means equiprobable, hence `probable' is not properly
explicated. A second traditional objection is that the classical interpretation
is of scarce applicability in science; in fact, adopting the classical interpre-
tation we have no meaningful way to express knowledge of the population
probabilistically, nor to evaluate individual hypotheses.
A generalization of the classical interpretation is the so-called logical
interpretation, advanced by K eynes (1921); Jereys (1939); C arnap (1950).
This interpretation depends on the P rinciple of Indierence and thus rests
on the idea that probabilities can be determined a priori by an examination
of the space of possibilities, but only when no knowledge indicating unequal
probabilities is available. The main aim of the logical interpretation is
to provide an account, as general as possible, of the degree of support or
conrmation that a piece of evidence e confers upon a given hypothesis h.
In C arnap's notation, the c-function precisely expresses this idea.10
According to the physical view, probability values are quantitative ex-
pressions of some feature of the world, not of our knowledge or beliefs. The
physical view is typically taken to encompass the frequency and the propen-
sity interpretations. A simple version of frequentism, due to V enn (1866),
states that the probability of an attribute A in a nite reference class B
is the relative frequency of the actual occurrence of A within B. F urther
developments of frequentism are due to von M ises (1928) and R eichenbach
(1935), who consider innite reference classes and identify probabilities with
the limiting relative frequencies of events or attributes therein. This second
sort of frequentism is also advocated by Salmon (1967). L imiting relative
10 A s w ell as ap p ealing to sy mmetry or indi erence, C arnap (1950, xx41{42) b ases
p rob ab ility values up on k now ledge of p h y sical p rob ab ilities. H e say s, `in th ese cases th e
p rob ab ility is determined w ith th e h elp of a given freq uency and its value is eith er eq ual or
close to th at of th e freq uency ' (C arnap , 1950, x42B ). C onseq uently, C arnap 's develop ment
of th e logical interp retation migh t b e classi ed alongside th e ob jective B ayesian ap p roach ,
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frequencies serve, in his approach, to determine the probability of evidence.
N ote that frequentism interprets generic probabilities; in order to associate
a frequency with a single case, a unique reference class must be associated
with the single case; that this can not be done in general is known as the
reference class problem .
The propensity interpretation is also located in the physical realm, since
probability is `in the world', so to speak, rather than `in our heads'|as it
is in the subjectivist approach and the classical and logical interpretations.
P robability is here conceived as a physical propensity, or disposition, or
tendency, of a given type of physical situation to yield an outcome of a
certain kind, or to yield a long run relative frequency of such an outcome.
The propensity interpretation was advanced by P opper (1957, 1959), who
was motivated by the desire to make sense of single-case probabilities, for
instance in quantum mechanics.
In the subjective interpretation probabilities are quantitative expressions
of an agent's opinion, or degree of belief, or epistemic attitude, or something
similar. F irst advances are due to R amsey (1926) and de F inetti (1937). De
F inetti's viewpoint is paradigmatic of personalistic approaches, for he rmly
stated that probability does not exist (in the physical sense), and that it
is possible to reconstruct and deduce probability theory just relying on the
subjectivist interpretation (de F inetti, 1993, pp. 248 ). In subjectivist
approaches, also called subjective B ayesian, probabilities are analyzed in
terms of betting behaviour. P robabilities are identied with the announce-
ment of the betting odds that a rational agent is willing to accept. A Dutch
book (against an agent) is a series of bets, each acceptable to the agent,
but which collectively guarantee her loss, whatever happens. Two Dutch
book theorems then follow. (i) If an agent's degrees of belief violate the
probability calculus, then she is liable to a Dutch book, and, conversely, (ii)
if an agent's degrees of belief conform to the probability calculus, then no
Dutch book can be made against her. A series of bets is called coherent if it
is not susceptible to a Dutch book. In subjectivist approaches, adherence to
the probability calculus is taken to be a necessary and su cient condition
for rationality.
It is typically objected that this personalistic account leads to arbitrari-
ness, that is, it is too subjective. In fact, two agents with exactly the same
evidence may assign dierent probability values to the same event and be
equally rational, provided that they do not violate the probability calculus.
(It is worth pointing out that de F inetti's betting interpretation derives
probabilities from utilities and rational preferences. The intimate link be-
tween utility of outcomes and probabilities is even more prominent in the
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interpretation is that probabilities and utilities can be derived from prefer-
ences among options that are constrained by certain putative consistency
principles.)
A solution to the objection of arbitrariness is attempted by empirically-
based subjectivism and also by the objective B ayesian interpretation of
probability. These interpretations require that further constraints beyond
coherence be satised before an agent's degrees of belief can be considered
rational. The former approach, empirically-based subjectivism, was advo-
cated e.g., by Salmon (1967, 1990). This approach requires that empirical
information constrain degrees of belief: if, for instance, an agent knows that
60% of people with a certain type of cancer recover, knows that a particu-
lar patient has this type of cancer, but knows nothing else pertinent, then
she should believe that the patient will recover to degree 0.6. The latter
approach, objective B ayesianism, was put forward by Jaynes (1957) and
goes beyond empirically-based subjectivism. According to this view, lack of
knowledge should also constrain degrees of belief: in the absence of evidence
the agent should be as equivocal as possible, e.g., if the agent does not have
any knowledge at all pertinent to a cancer patient then she should believe
that the patient will recover to degree 0.5; if her knowledge constrains her
degree of belief to fall in the interval [0:6;0:8]then she should chose the point
that most equivocates between recovery and non-recovery, i.e., 0.6.11 Thus
both information and lack of information about the world should be taken
into account in shaping epistemic probabilities. Information-theoretic con-
siderations motivate the use of entropy as a measure of the extent to which a
probability function equivocates; consequently Jaynes put forward the m ax-
im um entropy principle, which provides a formal framework for objective
B ayesianism: the agent's belief function should be a probability function,
from all those that satisfy constraints imposed by evidence, that has maxi-
mum entropy. In this framework, on a nite domain an agent's background
knowledge fully determines the degrees of belief that she ought to adopt.12
N ote that degree-of-belief interpretations|including subjectivism, em-
pirically-based subjectivism, and objective B ayesianism|interpret single-
case rather than generic probabilities: degrees of belief are associated with
11N ote th at th e interval [0:6;0:8] is not a con dence interval. If a study indicates th at
70% of p eop le recover and p rov ides a con dence interval [0:6;0:8], th en th e b est (alb eit
defeasib le) ev idence is th at 70% of p eop le recover and th e agent sh ould simp ly set h er
degree of b elief in recovery to 0.7. Rath er, th e interval constraint migh t b e generated
b y tw o studies, one of w h ich  nds a 60% recovery rate, th e oth er of w h ich  nds 80% ,
and neith er of w h ich is to b e p referred over th e oth er (on th e grounds of samp le size,
sp eci city etc.)| th en it is reasonab le to p lace one's degree of b elief somew h ere in th e
ordered interval generated b y th e freq uencies.
12(Williamson, 2005, x5.3). N ote th at th is is not necessarily th e case on in nite
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betting, and a bet in a generic outcome makes little sense.
In x5 we will argue that generic causal claims demand a frequency inter-
pretation, while single-case claims require an empirically-based or objective
B ayesian interpretation. In x6 will go further in arguing that an objective
B ayesian interpretation should be chosen.
5 D esiderata
In this section we shall put forward some requirements that an interpretation
of probability should meet.
A philosophical theory of probability should:
Objectivity: account for the objectivity of probability,
Calculi: explain how we reason about probability,
Epistemology: explain how we can know about probability,
Variety: cope with the full variety of probabilistic claims that we make,
Parsimony: be ontologically parsimonious.
We shall discuss each of these desiderata in turn, paying special attention
to the application to causal models of cancer.13
Objectivity
M any applications of probability invoke a notion of probability that is ob-
jective in a logical sense: there is a fact of the matter as to what the
probabilities are; if two agents disagree about a probability, at least one of
them must be wrong.14 F or example, the probability that a patient's breast
cancer will recur after treatment is supposed to depend on features of the
cancer (e.g., whether it is metastatic, whether it is H ER 2 positive, its ER
status), of the treatment, and of the patient. It is not simply a matter
of personal opinion: if two prognostic probabilities dier, at least one of
them must be wrong. A philosophical theory of probability should yield a
notion of probability that is objective in this logical sense|otherwise it is
not meeting the demands of these particular applications.
C learly the subjective interpretation of probability suers in this respect.
According to the subjective theory, probabilities are degrees of belief and
one can adopt any prior probabilities one likes as one's degrees of belief.
According to the subjective theory, then, one agent can give probability
13S ee Williamson (2006a) for discussion of similar desiderata as req uirements of a
p h ilosop h ical th eory of causality.
14L ogical ob jectiv ity contrasts w ith th e ontological sense of ob jectiv ity : p rob ab ilities
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0.9 to the patient's breast cancer recurring, another agent with the same
knowledge of the situation can give probability 0 to the same event, and
neither agent can be considered wrong.15 Empirically-based subjectivism
also suers, but to a lesser extent: if frequencies are known then probabil-
ity assignments are not arbitrary, but where frequencies are not known an
agent can choose her degrees of belief arbitrarily. The classical and logical
interpretations can also suer at the hands of Objectivity, since dierent
agents can construe dierent partitions of events as equipossible.
In contrast, frequency, propensity and objective B ayesian interpretations
all yield objective probabilities of varying forms. A frequency is objectively
determined by a reference class; a propensity is objectively determined by
the history of the universe up to the present time; under objective B ayesian-
ism a probability is objectively determined by an agent's knowledge. Thus
these interpretations fare better with respect to this desideratum.
Calculi
P robabilities are manipulated and inferences are drawn from them by means
of the probability calculus. This mathematical apparatus, based on axioms
put forward by K olmogorov (1933), has by now become well entrenched.
C onsequently a philosophical theory of probability should yield a notion
that satises the axioms of probability. Otherwise it is not a theory of
probability, but a theory of something else.
Some theories suer in this respect. According to some accounts, prob-
abilities are not real numbers but are intervals of numbers, pairs of real
numbers, or qualitative entities.16 According to other accounts probabili-
ties satisfy some axioms but not others|the frequency theory of von M ises
(1928), for instance, does not satisfy the axiom of countable additivity;
the propensity theory has problems with conditional probabilities.17 With
respect to this desideratum, then, degree-of-belief interpretations (subjec-
tivism, empirically-based subjectivism, and objective B ayesianism) fare bet-
ter than these other approaches.
15P rop onents of th e sub jective account tend to resp ond in tw o w ay s: b y say ing th at th e
sub jective th eory can account for ob jectiv ity in th e long run as di erent agents' b eliefs
converge to freq uencies, and b y say ing th at th ere is no furth er ob jectiv ity to b e found.
Wh ile th e  rst claim is notoriously p rob lematic (Williamson, 2005, x2.8), th e second
claim is simp ly dangerous. If th e sub jectiv ist h as no k now ledge th at b ears on recurrence
of b reast cancer and aw ards a degree of b elief 0.9, instead of th e ob jectively -determined
middling value 0.5, th en sh e may initiate unnecessarily aggressive treatment rath er th an
collect furth er ev idence| see x6. T h us th ere is furth er ob jectiv ity | derived from th e need
to eq uivocate in th e ab sence of ev idence| th at th e sub jective account ignores.
16S ee e.g., K ey nes (1921); K y b urg Jr (2003); Walley (1991).
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Epistemology
We come to know about probabilities in various ways: we measure popula-
tion frequencies, we appeal to symmetry arguments or scientic theories, we
make educated guesses, we derive some probabilities from others using the
probability calculus. A philosophical theory of probability should explain
how we can use such techniques to discover probabilities. If the theory re-
jects some of these techniques it should say where they go wrong and why
they are apparently successful.
This desideratum is a stumbling block for several theories. The classical,
logical and subjective theories can not account for the widespread use of
frequencies, while the frequency theory can not explain how degrees of be-
lief can oer access to probabilities. The propensity theory is oft criticised
for being metaphysical: it connects probability with scientic theories and
even degrees of belief,18 but struggles to identify a precise link with fre-
quency. H owever the empirically-based subjectivist and objective B ayesian
approaches allow background knowledge of any form|frequencies, symme-
tries, scientic theories included|to constrain an agent's rational degrees
of belief; by design these theories admit a variety of sources of probabilistic
knowledge.
Variety
P robabilistic claims are extremely varied. F or instance, claims are made
about single-case probabilities (e.g., the probability that a particular pa-
tient's cancer will recur) and generic probabilities (e.g., the probability of
recurrence among those who receive radiotherapy). M oreover, probabilities
are attached to a variety of entities, including events, sets, variables, sen-
tences, propositions and hypotheses. A philosophical theory of causality
should be able to cope with this variety|it should account for each use of
probability, or, if some uses are to be viewed as illegitimate, it should say
how such uses should be eliminated in favour of the legitimate uses. Oth-
erwise, the theory is at best a partial theory, a theory of som e of the uses
of probability.
This desideratum is a problem for many of the interpretations of proba-
bility. The frequency and propensity theories can not ascribe a probability
to a given hypothesis, but only yield the probability of observing a sample
if the hypothesis is true|on this point see C ourgeau (2004). M oreover,
the frequency theory is a generic theory; it views single-case probabilities
as illegitimate but provides no means of interpreting single-case claims in
terms of frequencies. If single-case probabilities are to be abandoned the
theory really ought to explain why their use, if so erroneous, is apparently
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so successful. Other interpretations ascribe probabilities to single cases,
and do not provide a means for interpreting population-level probabilities.
It seems that pluralism is the only option: have one interpretation for the
single-case and another for generic claims. B ut then work needs to be done
to explain why we apparently have a single concept of probability when in
fact there are at least two. The empirically-based subjectivist or the objec-
tive B ayesian route is perhaps most attractive here: use frequencies in the
generic case, and use these frequencies to constrain single-case degrees of
belief. The two notions of probability, frequency and degree of belief, are
tightly connected under these accounts and do not seem so disparate after
all.
Parsimony
Arguably a philosophical theory of probability should not make unwarranted
ontological commitments: if one can reduce probabilities to something else
in one's ontology then one should do that rather than take probabilities as
primitive. This is just Ockham's razor;it may be viewed as a methodological
or psychological requirement and as such subsidiary to the other desiderata.
P arsimony tells against the propensity interpretation, which usually takes
probabilities to be primitive. K eynes (1921) in his development of the logical
view also takes probabilities to be primitive. In contrast a frequency is a
feature of a sequence of observed outcomes and so presumably reducible to
entities already in a natural ontology. Similarly rational degrees of belief, the
entities of the subjective, the empirically-based subjective and the objective
B ayesian interpretations, will already be included in an ontology and do not
count as an ontological extra. Of course all this depends on ontology; an
ontology that contains only propensities may be more parsimonious than
one that contains rational degrees of belief among other things.
We see then that these desiderata help to isolate a viable interpretation
of probability. The propensity theory falls foul of C alculi, Epistemology,
V ariety and P arsimony; the frequency theory of C alculi, Epistemology and
V ariety; the classical, logical and subjective theories of Objectivity, Epis-
temology and V ariety. The empirically-based subjective theory does well,
though perhaps suers with respect to Objectivity. The objective B ayesian
interpretation seems to oer the most promise, when twinned with a fre-
quency interpretation of generic probabilities. This combination is a partic-
ularly attractive way of interpreting probability in causal models for cancer:
crucially, perhaps, the epistemology desideratum is satised|we can know
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combination makes sense both of generic causal inferences where probabil-
ities can be interpreted as frequencies, and of single-case causal inferences
where objective B ayesian probabilities are determined by empirical knowl-
edge including frequencies.
6 O bjective B ayesianism
C learly frequencies are required to make sense of generic probabilities, e.g.,
the probability of surviving more than ve years given metastatic breast
cancer is 0.4. We have also suggested that degrees of belief constrained by
frequencies should be used to make sense of the single case: if one knows
only the aforementioned generic probability then one should believe that
Audrey, who has metastatic breast cancer, will survive more than ve years,
to extent 0.4. This ties the two levels together in a natural way: generic
knowledge yields predictions about the single case.
As yet though, this leaves two interpretations of probability for the single
case. F irst, we have empirically-based subjectivism: an agent's degrees of
belief ought to be constrained by knowledge of frequencies; in the absence
of such knowledge they may be chosen arbitrarily. The second alternative is
objective B ayesianism: an agent's degrees of belief ought to be constrained
by knowledge of frequencies; in the absence of such knowledge they should
be as equivocal as possible. In our view the latter approach should be
adopted, as we shall now explain.
The main reason for preferring objective B ayesianismoverthe empirically-
based subjective theory is that objective B ayesianism is on average more
cautious when it comes to risky decisions. In cancer applications, single-
case probabilities are used to make treatment decisions.19 F or example, if
the probability of recurrence in a particular patient is very high, aggres-
sive treatments might be used; if the probability of recurrence is very low
then no further treatment is given; otherwise more evidence is garnered
and non-aggressive treatments are given. N ow suppose empirical evidence
forces degree of belief in recurrence to lie between 0 and 0.4, say. U nder
the empirically-based subjective theory, an agent is free to choose any de-
gree of belief within this interval [0;0:4]. So the agent may set degree of
belief 0, which will trigger abandonment of treatment. B ut under objective
B ayesianism, the agent must choose the most equivocal|i.e., middling|
degree of belief from this interval. So she must have degree of belief 0.4,
which may trigger the collection of more evidence in order to reach a rmer
opinion, and may trigger a non-aggressive treatment in the meantime. In
general, high-risk decisions tend to be triggered by high or low degrees of
belief; the objective B ayesian protocol ensures that such drastic actions only
19S ee e.g., Williams and Williamson (2006).234 Federica Russo and Jon Williamson
get taken if there is su cient empirical evidence to force the extreme prob-
abilities required to trigger them. If evidence is lacking then more middling
probabilities must be adopted so that less risky actions can be initiated and
further evidence can be collected.20
Tim M cG rew has posed the following objection to this argument:
Suppose that someone was diagnosed with cancer, underwent
treatment T1, and is being assessed for the success of T1. U nless
there is good evidence that T1 was successful, a more radical
treatment T2 is indicated. Empirical information indicates a
probability interval [0:6;0:95] for the success of T1. It would ap-
pear that objective B ayesianism requires us to adopt the proba-
bility 0.6 that T1 was successful, which may lie within the zone
that triggers aggressive treatment T2. There may be a good
answer to this worry, but it does, prim a facie, cast doubt on
the idea that objective B ayesianism always errs on the side of
caution, where caution can be equated with a preference for the
less radical treatment over the more radical.21
In response, the rst thing to note is that the most equivocal probability,
in this case 0.6, will not always be the most cautious|this depends on the
particular decision structure. At best we can say that on average with re-
spect to risky decisions the maximum entropy approach is the more cautious
policy|see Williamson (2006b, x8) for a full discussion of this point. We
can see that equivocal probabilities tend to be more cautious when we see
how decision scenarios arise. C onsider the above scenario. H ere the deci-
sion rule is that T2 will be instigated unless the probability of the success
of T1 is greater than some threshold. N ow a middling probability such as
0.6 indicates a lack of evidence and will normally trigger the collection of
further evidence to try to shift the probability to one extreme or the other.
In this case, however, collecting further evidence is not an option; this sug-
gests that the costs and risks associated with collecting further evidence are
greater than those associated with the treatment T2, for otherwise the deci-
sion structure would be dierent. T2 is triggered by 0.6 because, aggressive
though it is, this treatment is the least risky action available. So even in
this example, the objective B ayesian degree of belief is most cautious. The
fact is that when we set up decision protocols, the risky actions tend to
be triggered by extreme probabilities and conversely equivocal probabilities
tend to trigger the less risky actions; if a middling degree of belief triggers a
20 T h is argument is p resented in detail in Williamson (2006b ).
21P ersonal communication. We are very grateful to T im M cG rew for th is p oint and
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risky action then that is because it is the least risky action overall. We must
not equate caution with a preference for the less radical treatment over the
more radical, but with the choice of a less risky action over a more risky
action (in the absence of evidence that warrants the more risky action).
Objective B ayesianism is then the more cautious policy, on average.
In sum, when we take the applications of single-case probabilities into
account|in particular the application to cancer treatment|it becomes
clear that these probabilities are a guide to action. Some actions are more
drastic than others, and objective B ayesianism ensures that such actions
are not embarked upon lightly.
7 C onclusion
In this paper we have argued that epidemiology can be seen as paradigmatic
of the methodology of the social and health sciences. As far as causal
analysis is concerned, we considered cancer epidemiology for two reasons:
causal models for cancer (i) try to take into account both socio-economic
and biological factors, and (ii) are essentially probabilistic.
The analysis of causal models and of the probabilistic inferences they in-
duce suggests that two levels of inference ought to be distinguished: generic
and single-case. G eneric causal statements aim at positing average causal
relations, for instance by claiming that tobacco consumption is a power-
ful carcinogen or that healthy dietary habits can possibly prevent cancer.
Single-case causal statements tend to concern, instead, particular individ-
uals. They are used for diagnosis or for causal attribution, for instance to
assess the probability of recurrence of breast cancer in a particular patient.
As a matter of fact, both generic and single-case inferences are proba-
bilistic and therefore raise the problem of how probability should be inter-
preted. An overview of the leading interpretations|classical and logical,
frequency, propensity, subjective, empirically-based subjective, and objec-
tive B ayesian|shows that if we want to make sense of probabilistic state-
ments at both levels we have to opt for a pluralist interpretation: the fre-
quency interpretation is most appropriate for generic causal claims, and the
single case demands a B ayesian interpretation in which probabilities are
thought of as degrees of belief constrained by frequencies.
M oreover, cancer epidemiology appears to be of particular interest be-
cause it is both concerned with gaining general causal knowledge|e.g.,
about cancer aetiology|and with applying such general knowledge to a
particular individual. This is not true of all social and health sciences.
M any disciplines are more concerned with the general level and only in-
directly with the single-case or the other way around. Demography, for
instance, studies migration behaviour of populations but it is not directly236 Federica Russo and Jon Williamson
interested in the probability that a particular individual will migrate. On
the other hand, it is oft said that in medicine there are not illnesses but only
ill persons to cure. P hysicians, then, are more concerned with single-case
probabilities than with frequencies of disease.
Though not directly concerned with individuals, social sciences such as
sociology, demography or economics do have a bearing on the individual
since their results orient and guide public policies, for instance to reduce
unemployment or to discouragetobacco consumption. On the other hand, to
correctly assign single-case probabilities, physicians do need to take generic
probabilities into account. Thus, we'd better have a unied account of
the interpretation of probability that makes sense both at the generic level
and at the single-case. Such an account|we have argued|is objective
B ayesianism twinned with the frequency interpretation.
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A P robabilities, O dds and R isk s
The medical and epidemiological sciences often summarise results|e.g., of
logistic regressions or of meta-analyses|by means of risks and odds. Al-
though these are associational measures, arguably they have causal import
insofar as they provide evidence for a generic causal claim|e.g., smoking
causes lung cancer|or inform single-case inferences|e.g., predicting the
survival time of a particular individual|on the basis of these measures.
In several types of biomedical research, for instance case-control, cohort,
cross-sectional or experimental studies, risks and odds are used to quan-
tify the strength of the relation between two binary variables: a particular
outcome (disease) and presence of factor (exposure). Those results are cus-
tomarily presented in 2x2 contingency tables.Interp reting p rob ab ility 237
L et E and D denote two binary or dichotomous variables, each having
only two possible levels. F or the explanatory variable (exposure) E: exposed,
unexposed, and for the outcome (disease) D: yes, no. R esults in the table
are presented as counts of observations at each level. A 2x2 contingency
table has thus 4 cells. The table below shows the general layout of a 2x2
contingency table.
Disease
Exposure Y es N o
Exposed n11 n12
p11 p12
U nexposed n21 n22
p21 p22
The notation nij refers to the num ber of subjects observed in the corre-
sponding cell, i.e., to the number of observations in the i-th row (i = 1;2)
and j-th column (j = 1;2); the notation pij refers to the proportion of
subjects observed in the corresponding cell, where pij = nij=n, n being the
total number of observed subjects. The notation P(E) and P(D) will refer
to the marginal probabilities of exposure and disease, respectively.
With this data we can compute relative risks, odds, odds ratios and
estimate probabilities.
R elative risk
The relative risk (R R ) is dened as the ratio of risk in the exposed and
unexposed group:
n11=n
n21=n
=
p11
p21
Thus R R measures the incidence of the disease. R R > 1:0 indicates that
the risk of disease is increased when the risk factor (exposure) is present;
R R < 1:0 indicates that the risk of disease is decreased when the risk factor
is present, i.e., the factor is a protective factor or preventative. R R can also
be given a denition in terms of conditional probabilities:
P(DjE)
P(Dj:E)
:
Od d s ratio
The odds ratio (O R ) is another way to compare proportions in a 2x2 con-
tingency table. O R is computed from odds: it is the ratio of the odds of238 Federica Russo and Jon Williamson
disease in the exposed group and the odds of disease in the unexposed group.
The odds of an outcome is equal to the probability that the outcome does
occur divided by the probability that the outcome does not occur. In a 2x2
contingency table, the probability of an outcome is equal to the number of
times the outcome is observed divided by the total observations.
O R =
O ddsexp
O ddsu n exp
O ddsexp =
n11=(n11 + n12)
n12=(n11 + n12)
=
n11
n12
where n11=(n11 + n12) is the probability that the disease occurs in the ex-
posed group and n12=(n11+n12) is the probability that the disease does not
occur in the exposed group. In terms of conditional probabilities,
O ddsexp =
P(DjE)
P(:DjE)
:
Similarly,
O ddsu n exp =
n21=(n21 + n22)
n22=(n21 + n22)
=
n21
n22
;
where n21=(n21 + n22) is the probability that the disease occurs in the un-
exposed group and n22=(n21 + n22) is the probability that disease does not
occur in the unexposed group. Again, in terms of conditional probabilities,
O ddsu n exp =
P(Dj:E)
P(:Dj:E)
O R can now be computed as
n11=n21
n12=n22
=
n11n22
n12n21
:
or, equivalently
P(DjE)
P(:DjE)

P(:Dj:E)
P(Dj:E)
:
It is worth noting that the odds ratio of exposure O R =
O d d s exp
O d d s u n exp is equal
to the odds ratio of disease O R =
O d d s D yes
O d d s D n o . There is a mathematical relation
between odds and probabilities:
P(DjE) =
O ddse x p
1 + O ddse x p
and
O ddse x p =
P(DjE)
1   P(DjE)
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Interpreting RR, OR and probabilities
Although calculations are fairly easy, the interpretation appears to be more
tricky. F or instance, Sistrom and G arvan (2004, p. 16) claim: `::: an R R
equal to 2.0 means that an exposed person is twice as likely to have an
adverse outcome as one who is not exposed, and an R R of 0.5 means that
an exposed person is half as likely to have the outcome.' Or (ibidem):
`Odds and probabilities are dierent ways of expressing the chance that an
outcome may occur.' H ere there is a tension between a generic and single-
case interpretation of R R , O R and probabilities.
Similarly, B land and Altman (2000) on the one hand explain the odds
and odds ratios as means to compare groups, but, on the other, in giving
an example, they talk in terms of individuals: `The probability that a child
with eczema will also have hay fever is estimated by the proportion 141/561
(25.1% ). ::: Similarly, for children without eczema the probability of having
hay fever is estimated by 928/14453 (6.4% ).'
Two remarks are in order. F irstly, this last quotation may look puzzling
unless we make clear that the `child' that B land and Altman refer to is a
statistical individual, i.e., an individual randomly sampled from the popu-
lation. In this case the probability may be construed as generic rather than
single-case.
Secondly, as shown above, the calculation of risks and odds involves pro-
portions|i.e., the numbers of subjects who got/didn't get the disease and
were/were not exposed to the factor compared to the whole population. B e-
cause calculation involves proportions, R R and O R have a natural generic
interpretation and do not make sense in the single case. C onsequently, the
corresponding probabilities need a frequentist interpretation. H owever, if
the denitions in terms of conditional probabilities are preferred instead,
one might argue that these probabilities are not the frequencies drawn from
the 2x2 table but subjective probabilities. If so, then risks and odds are all
single-case, referring to a single individual, and they do not say anything
about the population. B ut of course this view is prone to the objections
raised in x5. F rom a normative point of view, rational degrees of belief
should be based on empirical evidence such as frequencies, and otherwise
maximally equivocal. Thus an objective B ayesian interpretation ought to
be preferred instead for the single case. A further advantage of the objective
B ayesian interpretation is that if a contingency table based on frequencies
is incomplete, one can generate a complete contingency table by lling in
missing values with objective B ayesian probabilities.240 Federica Russo and Jon Williamson
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